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1. Democracy as unwavering principle is the only possible voluntarist response to present 
and future crises resulting from any cultural misunderstanding between East and West. 
 
2. Cosmopolitanism as response to Globalism is the Kantian cultural precondition on the 
way to a violence-less, then violence-free world. Within the shift to cosmopolitanism is 
required a Clausewitz-like reflection on war and the conditions for the external use of 
violence for democratic purposes. 
 
3. Progressivism is a cultural reference point of unsuspected potentiality, to be set by 
heirs of the socialist and social-democratic tradition in the right-left divide.  
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
1. Prophetic words  
. . . No war is any longer possible for Prussia-Germany except a world war and a 
world war indeed of an extent and violence hitherto undreamt of. Eight to ten 
millions of soldiers will massacre one another and in doing so devour the whole 
of Europe until they have stripped it barer than any swarm of locusts has ever 
done. The devastations of the Thirty Years’ War compressed into three or four 
years, and spread over the whole Continent; famine, pestilence, general 
demoralisation both of the armies and of the mass of the people produced by acute 
distress; hopeless confusion of our artificial machinery in trade, industry and 
credit, ending in general bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their traditional 
state wisdom to such an extent that crowns will roll by dozens on the pavement 
and there will be no body to pick them up; absolute impossibility of foreseeing 
how it will all end and who will come out of the struggle as victor; only one result 
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is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the establishment of the conditions 
for the ultimate victory of the working class.  
Frederic Engels, London, 15 December 18871 
2. A world made safe for democracy  
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that 
the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for 
every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, 
determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other 
peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the 
world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very 
clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program 
of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; 
In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel 
ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated 
together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in 
purpose. We stand together until the end.  
An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the 
principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal 
terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. 
Woodrow Wilson, 8 January 1918.2  
3. Support for democracy, and for democratic forces in undemocratic regions 
unwavering principle of international relations 
Support for democracy throughout the world must become an unwavering 
principle of development policy – and of international relations in general. The 
rhetorical support for democracy expressed by the EU, the USA and other world 
powers is too often compromised in practice by support for convenient or friendly 
dictatorships. Governments justify this in the name of pragmatism and national 
interest, but time and again – in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia 
– we have seen that support for undemocratic government's leads to instability 
and conflict as well as impoverishment and abuse of human rights. And when – 
sooner or later – change comes, the credibility and national interests of those who 
have supported the dictatorship inevitably suffer. Democracy is perhaps the most 
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powerful instrument we have for development and peace. Support for democracy, 
and for democratic forces in undemocratic regions, must become an unwavering 
principle of international relations. 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, May 2003.3  
One will find difficulty in discovering the thread common to these longish quotes, let 
alone of what such quotes have in common with the issue of cultural understanding. 
Allow me to bewilder you further by suggesting that the First World War offers that 
denominator, partly because of what it represents objectively, a waste land of 
unprecedented proportions for reasons that historians still quarrel about, but mostly for 
what it underlines in the negative, that is the failed Wilsonian principles of ‘self-
determination’ for colonised peoples as the other coin of a world the US president wanted 
to make ‘safe for democracy’. 
 
There is no such thing about cultural understandings -- i.e. cultural characteristics that 
require for Shi‘i Iraqis, Confucean Chinese, Nomadic Roma, Catholic Irish, Orthodox 
Serbs or Muslim Women a treatment informed other than by democratic values --  which 
is specific enough to undermine that which every human being, every political 
movement, and every government agree upon nowadays: that government must result 
from the regular and unfettered choice of its citizens, and that individuals have 
fundamental rights which need to be protected effectively erga omnes. All the rest, 
arguments about historic stages, religious and other types of fundamentalisms, fear of 
universal suffrage leading to undemocratic movements taking over, demographic 
considerations, special treatment to protect ‘differences’, all fall either within the pale of 
that common denominator as details, or outside it as false or dishonest figleaves to deny 
the need for the strict implementation of these two characteristics. At worst, one can 
quarrel about some secondary tactics to affirm that common denominator, but even 
tactics fall rapidly into place when it is sincerely acknowledged in the thought process 
and actively pursued as policy. 
 
What has World War One got to do with that ?  
 
When shorn of its proletariat jargon, it is hard to deny that the quote by Frederic Engels 
was indeed prophetic. It took Europe two active world wars, an eighty-year long Soviet 
parenthesis and one cold war to overcome in the main the spectre of war within it. This is 
not the case in the Middle East, whether in the continuing frictions with the EU and the 
West generally, but more importantly within the ME. This is the subject of the major 
‘cultural understanding’ problem implied in our Seminar.4 While the war prophesy of 
                                                 
3 Europe and a New Global Order- Bridging the Global Divides, Report for the Party of 
European Socialists, May 2003, p.70. 
4 The theoretical argument, though not a particularly profound one, is now rooted in Prof. 
Huntington’s famous Clash of Civilisations, New York 1996 (originally an article in 
Foreign Affairs, 1993), which remains true in so far as the Middle East and the West  are 
being estranged by extremes on the alleged ground of religious differences, and false in 
 3
Engels (and Lenin) continues to sound impressive with regard to Europe, it belongs to the 
past. In contrast, it remains as current today for the Near and Middle East (NME) as it 
was from the aftermath of the earth-shattering events in the region represented by World 
War I and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, through to the three Gulf Wars.5 
 
So whenever a general, cultural metaphor is needed to render the feel for the phase at 
hand in the Middle East, it is difficult to conjure up a more powerful perspective than this 
image of the falling crowns whom no one will be found to pick up in the collapse. The 
First World War was a defining moment in European and world history, dozens of 
crowns rolled with no one to pick them up, but the cultural impact was no less 
devastating in the European psyche, as the war ended, not in a bang, but with a whimper, 
in TS Eliot’s immortalised finale of the Waste Land. British citizens continue a century 
later to don the red poppy of remembrance for WWI’s dead, in another testimony to the 
persistent collective wound; Hans Castorp descending to his death from The Magic 
Mountain is a third immortal cultural depiction, so is the last volume of Proust’s 
Remembrance. Less known is the devastation wrought in the NME, the most powerful 
book to date on that period being David Fromkin’s A Peace to end all peace.6 The 21st 
century stage was set, in Balfour’s declaration and the Sèvres conference, for a 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict that would get the sad honour of the longest ongoing living 
conflict in modern history, while other nation-states of very old civilisations were also 
being carved out for Anglo-French colonialism.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
so far as a) the book’s seven ‘civilisations’ are a figleaf, the only real ‘clash’ meant 
concerns Islam and the West (this premise is also true for our Seminar); and b) the Israeli 
exception gets one footnote in the book, and no recognition as the key point to the 
‘clash’. More on this and the relevant references in our The Middle East into the 21st 
Century, London 1996, 173-76, and in Democracy in America (in Arabic), Beirut 2001, 
115-25. 
5 One should think the Gulf war as a continuum of Saddam Hussein's failed legitimacy 
through three wars, the first being the World War I-like Iran-Iraq butchery of 1980-88, 
with its use of gas by Hussein both against his people and against the Iranians, the second 
the occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 and its liberation in January 1991, and the third, 
which is the liberation/occupation of Iraq in April 2003, which is ongoing. We have tried 
to demonstrate in a number of publications since 1986 that the two first wars were in fact 
the result of Saddam Hussein’s fuite en avant because of the domestic pressure on his 
rule. See our “A l’origine de la guerre Iran-Irak: l'axe Najaf-Teheran”, Les Cahiers de 
l'Orient, Paris, Autumn 1986, 119-136, “Obstacles to democratization in Iraq: A reading 
of post-revolutionary Iraqi history through the Gulf War”, in E. Goldberg, R. Kasaba and 
J. Migdal eds., Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law and Society, 
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1993, 224-247. The last, ongoing war, is 
impossible to understand outside the frustrated end of the second one which left Hussein 
in power despite his severe military defeat.  
6 D. Fromkin, A Peace to end all Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation 
of the modern Middle East, New York 1989. The phrase 'war to end all wars' is 
Wilsonian. 
 4
Some lively historians like Robert Fisk like to draw a 1917/2003 parallel in the 
occupation by Baghdad by English and now Anglo-American power. This parallel 
argument can easily be made, and it is unfortunate that the skepticism prevailing in the 
area is all too easily borne out by history. This explains the relevance of the second quote, 
which is Wilson’s dual promise of self-determination and democracy for the peoples of 
the Middle East. The promise remains so actual because it has remained unfulfilled since 
World War I. Instead, as the American isolationists collapsed the honest design of the 
most visionary of all American presidents, the ugly face of Anglo-French domination 
took over, and everyone is still paying the price of the promise betrayed. Instead of self-
determination + democracy, we have had various colonisations, in addition to the 
colonial-settler experience of Jewish foreign implantation in Palestine,7 an experience 
which has since taken over fascist characteristics8 with the advent of the leader 
‘personally responsible’ for the massacres of Sabra and Shatila to the helm in Israel in 
2000, and the descent to inferno since.9  
                                                 
7 The ‘colonial’ character was demonstrated over thirty years ago by Maxime Rodinson 
in “Israel, fait colonial ?”, Special issue of Les Temps Modernes on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, July 1967, 17-90. It is available also in a 1973 English translation. 
8 The qualification is Tony Judt in a recent article, “Israel: The Alternative”, The New 
York Review of Books, October 23, 2003. Note that Judt limits the fascist qualification to 
the targeted assassinations' policy. While the qualification is open to question in our 
view, one element is certain, Israel has lost its long-standing character of an abolitionist 
state in the repertory of capital punishment-free countries. More gravely, governments 
and people in Europe and the United States, as well as colleagues in the Arab world, still 
talk of Israel as the 'only democracy' in the region. We have argued, on the basis of the 
groundbreaking work of the leading sociologist of Israel, Baruch Kimmerling, that it is 
wrong to consider Israel as a democratic country. For details, and references cited herein, 
Mallat et al. “The need for a paradigm shift in American thinking: Middle Eastern 
responses to ‘what we are fighting for’”, available on mallat.com in English and Arabic 
(also published in full in al-Nahar), and French (in press, Travaux et Jours)   
9 Kimmerling has recently coined the word ‘politicide’ to describe the actions of Ariel 
Sharon towards the Palestinians. Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War 
against the Palestinians, London 2003. However enticing a concept, I am reluctant to 
introduce it for a practice which has precedents in history, and which is more accurately 
perceived as racial-colonial historically, and undemocratic both in contemporary law and 
practice. For the non-democratic nature of Israeli governance, see Kimmerling, The 
Invention and Decline of Israeliness, California 2001, p.181: “Given the nature of Israeli 
‘reality’, as described in this book…, it is easy to conclude that only one of the five 
necessary conditions for considering Israel as a democracy is present… The main reason 
for this is the historically inherent inability to separate religion from nationalism and 
nationality implicit in the ‘Jewishness’ of the Israeli state.” This does not prevent “Israeli 
political culture and most of its academic analysts, however, [from] systematically and 
compulsively deny[ing] the basically undemocratic nature of the Israeli regime.” (at 
p.182); and our “Lawyering in the Arab world: Lessons contemporary and classical”, in 
George Sfeir ed., Modernisation of Laws in the Arab World, forthcoming. 
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Which brings us to Poul Rasmussen’s quote and its corollary: for any cultural 
understanding, the unwavering promise must join an unwavering premise, which is 
democracy as universally understood. We can and should talk tactics, this is why we are 
here today. But such a clear definition of cultural understanding comes first, which means 
that Westerners must embrace democracy for the NME, and gear their tactics towards 
enforcing it. This is the cultural understanding which is our message, that is us ‘decent’ 
Arabs and MEasterners, to our US and European friends both in government and in 
opposition. It is as simple as it may sound naïve, for we know what the alternative looks 
like in an area full of precedents. A lack of common understanding about democracy is a 
certain recipe for a deeper and more tragic repeat of the ME catastrophes: Sabra and 
Chatila 1982, Halabja 1988, New York 2001, and the visages of these and other mass 
crime perpetrators, Saddam Hussein, Usama ibn Laden, and Ariel Sharon.  
 
Allow me to push my luck with predictions, and the sense that the rot has taken root in 
the region so deeply that things are very much in the vein of the troubled period of 1917-
1922, and has been indeed since at least 1991 when the promise of freedom from Saddam 
Hussein was betrayed by the promisor, George Bush Sr:10 the ugliest dictatorship in the 
area was allowed by US troops to undermine the largest popular revolt in the history of 
Iraq. 2003 can be perceived in two ways: as a fulfillment of that betrayed promise, or as 
another episode of colonialism. We are at a turning point, and a world full with a 
‘troubled air’ (Shakespeare, Woodrow Wilson) can be pregnant of many a possibility. 
Only democracy as common cultural understanding will allow the advent of the joined 
Wilson-Engels prophesy in terms of the democratic promise for the region: a change in 
governance, that is a change of governments. It is an oddity that the neoconservative 
administration in the US sounds far more Wilsonian than skeptical Europeans,11 and 
another useful cultural understanding between the EU and the US is needed for that very 
post-modern conflict which is Iraq.  
 
Leaving aside the issue of tactics and strategy to other occasions, let us indulge instead in 
some ‘looking into the seeds of time’, as Banquo in Macbeth. From the several questions 
emerging from a ‘cultural understanding’ between East and West, it might sound 
premature to talk about falling crowns, at a moment when radical republics are 
increasingly turning into absolute monarchies, and the sons of ‘socialist’ dictators filling 
up the shoes of their fathers as a recurrent pattern across the region. Premature it is not. 
 
Surely, this is the manifestation of how deeply the rot has from the point of view of 
cultural understanding, which joins a simple battle for the meaning of words, like 
republics, democracy, sovereignty, or peace: On the emptied republican promise, there is 
hardly a single dictator in the region who is not seeking to perpetuate his power through 
his son. As democracy and independence (or self-determination), Selim Abou has 
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courageously battled the emptying of such words in the modern public sphere,12 and I 
have attempted my own, more modest attempt to draw the attention to the (mis)use of the 
concept of terrorism by both the Israeli and Arab leaders as another example of how 
quickly words get drafted for maximum emptiness of truth, and maximum ideological 
use.13  
 
Empty words and twisted meanings are but one manifestation of the depth of the rot in  
NME ‘monarblics’, as the Arabic ugly hybrid neologism has it nowadays (jamlaka, from 
mamlaka, monarchy, and jumhuriyya, republic). So deep and twisted the rot has become 
that the key issue is not so much whether the crowns will roll – they have, at least from 
the perspective of legitimacy, long fallen in disfavour. The question is how to allow these 
crowns to roll with least possible bloodshed, including for present and would-be kings. 
This is where we must all read from the same cultural partition, which is how to hasten 
the change of governments across the region in favour of democracy. This is also why we 
need to overcome evident paradoxes, like in Iraq, of an occupation becoming a liberation; 
of bringing Saudi rule to democratic standards without even more medieval characters 
further wreaking havoc in Mecca and Riyadh; of restoring sovereignty and regular 
alternation in power to Lebanon without allowing local and regional mischief from 
making it lapse into civil war; of ending Israeli exceptionalism by protecting the Jewish 
community in Palestine-Israel without preventing Palestinian non-Jews, -- who have been 
expelled, dominated or discriminated against by Jews since 1948 --, from moving onto 
the steady path of full individual and collective equality with Israeli Jews. Like others, we 
have written books and articles on tactics and strategy for the Middle East to come of 
age, but the main democratic partition must take root, and have teeth. Like others, we 
have sometime taken action, for action, not words, will offer the true test.14 Mir hilft der 
Geist ! auf einmal seh’ ich Rat/ Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die Tat.15 So far, 
the Wilsonian promise remains unfulfilled, and ‘the last war dance’, as in the following 
section of the Engels passage, continues to wreak havoc on NME societies. 
 
This will not be easy: from the Wilsonian prediction of the turning point for the world in 
1918, to the elder Bush’s talk about ‘the new world order’ in the wake of the Gulf War, to 
the younger Bush’s present promise of democracy after the third Gulf War, all the 
‘victors’ have seen it their victory as the start of a brave new world. So far, ‘Twas new to 
thee’ only, as in Shakespeare’s famous cynical reminder by Prospero to the naïve 
wonderment of his daughter in The Tempest. The difficult task ahead is the challenge of 
                                                 
12 Sélim Abou, Les Libertés, Beirut 2003, 129-50 (Speech of the Rector of USJ, 19 
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history ?,” Crimes of War Project, September 2002 (Special issue on September 11, a 
year after), www.crimesofwar.org; “The original sin: ‘Terrorism’ or ‘crime against 
humanity’ ?”, Case Western Journal of International Law, 34, 2002, 245-248. 
14 In national and international fora, see the Sabra and Shatila affair started in Brussels in 
June 2001, the Indict organization, founded in London in 1996 to bring to justice the Iraqi 
leaders, and the Imam Musa Sadr’s disapperance case, started in Beirut in 2002. 
15 Goethe, Faust, lines 1236-7. 
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history through an Engels-like prediction reactualised: while the rot strikes deep, helping 
the change, manufacturing it with a democratic purpose will avoid unnecessary 
parentheses such as the Soviet experiment, or painful corrections like World War 2: in 
Middle Eastern terms, Islamic and other religious fundamentalisms, or continuous civil 
and regional wars. 
 
We could stop here, but this Congress deserves more than underlining democracy as 
common cultural understanding with our Western friends, a position clearly reached 
already in Poul Rasmussen’s report, so let me indulge in a few further reflections on 
globalism, war, and progressivism.  
 
There is one radical proposal which can be contributed in this session, which is the 
replacement of our global efforts with cosmopolitan ones. They are, of course, two coins 
of the same phenomenon of a shrinking planet, but globalism is a fact, I would submit, 
whereas cosmopolitanism is a choice. The latter pedigree is Kantian, and Kantian 
Cosmopolitanism is a concept which we should consider in response to free-flow 
unhindered market-drifting Globalism. Cosmopolitanism as corrective to Globalism is 
what we in this forum can offer as a modicum of renewal to the world, in the sense so 
clearly delineated in Kant’s treatise on ‘Eternal Peace’, Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795), 
which moved the intellectual horizons of humanity from the mutualism of Christian and 
other world religions to a rule of higher, more sophisticated law – Kant’s celebrated 
principle in the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft for every person to act as if her action be 
a universal law.16 In international relations, this translates into Kantian Cosmopolitanism 
for the international action of governments and people, an action which is premised on its 
status of universal, enforceable law. This is one theme we should perhaps research 
further, especially in consideration to the aporia of war and international law in a post-
Clausewitzian world.  
 
A third theme emerges under the label ‘progressive’, which is a shared understanding of 
political culture in the US-EU-NME triangle, for it rings a particular bell in the Middle 
East, with the tradition in Lebanon of the late Kamal Jumblatt, and in Iraq of the late 
Kamel al-Chadirji; in Europe with its rediscovered Jauressian values through the present 
project, and in the US in the rediscovery of the Progressive Age. The Progressive Age, 
which was fleetingly revived in John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000 in the US, 
has been summed up in the important book by Robert Putnam in ways which will be 
familiar to this Congress: 
 
As a political movement, the Progressives were responsible for the most 
thoroughgoing renovation of public policies and institutions in American history, 
rivaled only by the New Deal. The secret ballot (1888, Kentucky); popular 
initiative and referendum (1898, South Dakota); presidential primary elections 
(1900, Minnesota); the city manager system (1903, Galveston, Texas); the direct 
election of senators (1913); women's suffrage (1893, Colorado, 1920 in the U.S. 
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Constitution) – in a few short decades all these fundamental features of our 
political process were introduced into state and local politics and then gradually 
diffused nationwide. Quite apart from these basic political reforms, this was also 
the most intense period of local administrative reform in our history. 
Nationally, the Progressives laid the institutional cornerstones for fiscal and 
monetary policy with the Federal Reserve (1913), the income tax (1913), and the 
Bureau of the Budget (1921). The first consumer protection legislation in 
American history (the Food and Drug Administration and federal meat inspection 
in 1906, the Federal Trade Commission in 1914); the first environmental 
legislation (the national forest system in 1905 and the national park system in 
1913); the creation of the Departments of Commerce and Labor (1913) and the 
General Accounting Office (1912); strengthened antitrust regulations (1903); 
child labor laws (1916); the eight-hour day (beginning with the railways in 1916); 
workmen's compensation (1916); first federal regulation of the communications 
industry (1910); the US Bureau of Investigation (1908; renamed the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in 1935); federal campaign finance regulation (1907); the 
biggest trade liberalization in more than half a century (1913); the foundations for 
federal water policy in the western states (1902); and Mother's Day (1914) – 
hardly an area of public policy was left untouched by the Progressive avalanche 
of policy initiatives. Typically, innovation began with experimental reforms in 
states and local communities, then gathered strength as it thundered toward 
Washington.17  
 
Both the content and context of this long quote invite a reflection on progressivism as the 
convergence of unexpected historic strands, beyond the traditional ideological divide, of 
the EU-US-NME triangle: as for context, Robert Putnam, a leading American sociologist, 
chose this particular federal age to underline his call for the renewal of community bond 
and feelings in America, very much in the way this Congress seems to appeal to a 
'progressive' vocable which puts it under a tradition that starts with the Enlightenment, 
and develops in a particular belief in human progress. Under this form of cultural 
understanding, perhaps we can ensure that the process does lead not only to the Middle 
East becoming part of a project on global progressive governance, - or progressive 
cosmopolitanism as we are suggesting -, but that the common denominator reaches well 
beyond the NME geographically. I suspect, though cannot be as comfortable as on my 
Mid-eastern turf, that the Gandhi and Sun Yat Sen traditions have much to say about 
‘progressivism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, and we should invite Indian and Chinese 




17 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, New York 2000, 398. 
